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ABSTRACT
Patients want the assurance that the confidentiality of their
records accessed through Electronic Health Records (EHR) are
safe. With increasing implementation of EHR for health care, pri-
vacy concern remains a barrier that limits patients’favorable judg-
ment of this technology. Sensitive records can be compromised
and this represents problems in EHRs, which are considered to
bemore efficient, less error prone, and of higher availability com-
pared to traditional paper health records. In this article, a session-
based hierarchical key encryption system was developed that
allows patient to have full control over certain nodes of their
health records. Health records were organized in a hierarchical
structure with records further broken down into subcategories.
Cryptography was used to encrypt the health records in their dif-
ferent subcategories. Patients’ generate a root keys using Blum
Blum Shub Algorithm for pseudorandomnumber generator from
which the session-based subkeys were derived, and only autho-
rize users can access these records within a designated period
marked as session. The system development demonstrates one
way patients’ privacy and security can improve using session-
based hierarchical key encryption system for EHR.
Introduction
Security is a major concern in today’s computerized solutions and cryptography has
been recognized as one of the most popular technologies to solve the security prob-
lems in several applications. Cryptography is simply the art of secret writing and
securing information from eavesdroppers. Encryption can be applied in verifying
the authentication of a user accessing a system and securing communication in net-
work applications areas. Generally, the strength of most key-based cryptographic
systems is dependent on the security of the cipher keys, a security system without
strong management procedures and processes has no security (Martin, 2006).
Key management is the administration of tasks involved with protecting, storing,
backing up, and organizing encryption keys. Cryptography keys falls into two
CONTACT Adebayo Omotosho bayotosho@gmail.com Department of Computer Science, Landmark
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categories: private key and public key cryptography. A private key (or a symmetric
key) is used to perform encryption or decryption using symmetric cryptographic
algorithms, and the same key is required for encryption and decryption. A public
key is used in asymmetric algorithms where the key used to encrypt a message
is not the same as the key used to decrypt it. Each user has a pair of a public
encryption key and a private decryption key. Cryptographic key management
encompasses the entire lifecycle of a cryptographic key. Keying material and life
cycle includes: user registration, system and user initialization, keying material
installation, key establishment, key registration, operational use, storage of keying
material, key update, key recovery, key deregistration and destruction, and key
revocation (Barker, Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007).
Electronic Health Records (EHR) are online versions of health record paper
charts. An EHR may include medical history, notes, and other information about
an individual. EHR allow providers to use information more effectively to improve
the quality and efficiency of care, but EHR will not change the privacy protections
or security safeguards that apply to patients’ health information. Privacy concern
is arguably a major barrier that restricts appreciation of EHR systems which are
considered to be more efficient, less error prone, and of higher availability com-
pared to traditional paper record systems (Sun, Zhu, Zhang, & Fang, 2011). Privacy
and security are important in EHR, however security can only be improved upon
but cannot be totally guaranteed because the authentication of data can be compro-
mised by attackers. Personal health information of hundreds of thousands of people
has been compromised because of security lapses at hospitals, insurance companies,
and government agencies. EHR are open to possible abuses and threats and it has
been reported that large amounts of sensitive healthcare information held in data
centers is vulnerable to loss, leakage, or theft (Benaloh, Chase, Horvitz, & Lauter,
2009).
Existing methods used in EHR to protect patient’s privacy are inadequate given
that: (a) the use of smart card approach requires the presence of the patient to have
access to the health record, and the smartcard can either be stolen or misplaced, and
also be compromised (Jeng & Wang, 2006); (b) approaches that grant full access
control to the patient makes it difficult in times of emergency (Hupperich, Löhr,
Sadeghi, & Winandy, 2012); (c) recent approaches relied heavily on cryptography
technologies whose popular flaw is the security of the cipher keys (Peltier, 2016; Pre-
marathne et al., 2016; Smart, 2016). This study is aimed at the use of cryptography
using hierarchical session-based keys to improve patients’ privacy in EHR.
Keymanagement cycle
On key generation, personalized cryptographic keys from face biometric were
generated with a two stage technique in Teoh, Ngo, and Goh (2004). In the first
stage, transformation of biometric input was discretized to generate a set of bit
representation and a set of tokenized pseudo random number, coined as FaceHash.
In the second stage, FaceHash was then securely reduced to a single cryptographic
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key via Shamir secret sharing. Using hierarchy (Access Table ACCESS) and Diffie–
Hellman based key generation scheme, Zych, Petkovic, and Jonker (2008) presented
a key management scheme for cryptographic enforcement of access control where
each user stores a single key and is capable of correctly calculating the suitable keys
needed to access requested data. This technique does not require encryption of the
same data several times with the keys of different users or groups of users. As the
system was designed mainly for the purpose of access control, space needed for
storing public parameters was significantly reduced. Omotosho and Emuoyibofarhe
(2015) presented a method for private key generation, sharing, and storage from
image features through Gray Level Co-occurrence Matrix. In order to achieve
storage and generation at the same time, cipher keys were derived, rather than
hidden in users’ images, from a second order statistics for keys computation and
recomputation. The study was able to generate reproducible 120bits key length suit-
able for symmetric encryption. This method was further improved and deployed in
Omotosho, Emuoyibofarhe, and Meinel (2017) to include key expiration through
the addition of time features embedded into the keys in an EHR application. This
approach implemented with fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment bio-cryptography
was able to ensure patients control of their EHR privacy.
On key derivation, Lin, Huang, Lai, and Lee (2009) used a Shared Key derivation
Protocol (SKP) that comprises, key derivation function, hash function (SHA-1) and
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). A group key management protocol
based on shared key derivation methods was developed to reduce the communi-
cation and computation elevation of centralized secure group communication sys-
tems. With shared key derivation, the server does not have to encrypt and transmit
new keys to members who have enough information to derive the keys by them-
selves. The performance of rekeying operations including single join, single leave,
and batch update improved. Similarly, Lee, Ho, and Lee (2011) described a new key
management scheme to facilitate control of EHR by providing two functionalities,
using master key approach and threshold secret sharing. First, a patient can autho-
rize more than one healthcare institute within a designated time period to access his
or her protected health information. Second, a patient can revoke authorization and
add new authorized institutes at any time as necessary. This implementation was
reported to be time and cost efficient
With respect to key distribution, in Zhu, Bao, Deng, Kankanhalli, and Wang
(2005), the challenges in security, efficiency, flexibility, and adaptively in key man-
agement in large Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) was solved by using two
approaches. At the architecture level, a new key management scheme was proposed
to distribute cryptographic keys and provide certification services. At the algorithm
level, two algorithms which are based on threshold cryptography and Feldman’s
VSS scheme, were used independently for the key management scheme. The uti-
lization of autonomous key management using Shamir Secret sharing ensures that
a stronger protection to the Global Secret Key can be provided. Jeng and Wang
(2006) presented a work on key generation, key derivation, and key selection that
used Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) to solve the hierarchical access control
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problem. An efficient key management and derivation scheme based on the ECC
was presented where each class in the hierarchy is allowed to select its own secret
key and adding or deleting classes was solved without the necessity of regenerating
keys for all the users in the hierarchy.
Key generation, key update, and key distribution were described in Pour,
Kumakawa, Kato, and Itoh (2007) using Logical Key Hierarchy. The authors pro-
posed an improved protocol for rekeying in logical hierarchy model for secure mul-
ticast and increasing the efficiency of key distribution in leave operation. The pro-
tocol was able to reduce rekeying overhead, the number of encryptions and trans-
missions as well as the multicast message size. Using Microsoft Active Directory for
storing keys, Acar, Belenkiy, Ellison, and Nguyen (2010) carried out a study on key
distribution, key update, and key storage. A key lifecycle management that can be
used for cryptographic data protection was developed. The software client accesses
keys and other metadata stored in a distributed repository, and the system hides
all key management tasks from the user. The user specifies a key management pol-
icy and the system enforces this policy. Xiao and colleagues (2007) reported on key
establishment, key predistribution, key discovery, and key revocation in sensor net-
work. This work discussed private key schemes (single network wide key, pairwise
key establishment, trusted base station, and authentication), public key schemes
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman [RSA] and ECC), key predistribution schemes, and hier-
archical keymanagement. The study provided an overview of these techniques, each
of which offers different advantages and disadvantages. It was observed that no key
distribution technique is faultless to all the scenarioswhere sensor networks are used
and, hence, techniques employed must rely on the requirements of target applica-
tions and resources of each individual sensor network.
Mukherjee, Gupta, and Agarawal (2008) presented key generation and key estab-
lishment research that uses threshold cryptography and Node-Group-Key (NGK)
mapping. Their work introduces key generation mechanism employing a central
trusted entity, only during initialization using a group key algorithm and the con-
cept of NGKmapping. This was done with regards to the existing solutions to group
security in MANETs depending on multicast Core Based Tree for key distribution
which is a problem for dynamic and sparse groups with changing neighborhoods.
Using this approach, keys were established between groupmembers with absolutely
no prior communication. Khan, Pastrone, Lavagno, and Spirito (2012) proposed a
key establishment that employs ECC. An improved, secure mutual authentication
and key establishment protocol based on ECC, through which different classes of
nodes with very different capabilities can authenticate each other and establish a
secret key for secure communication was generated. Ziauddin and Dailey (2010),
focused on key generation and key recovery using fuzzy commitment approach
to biometric key management. Their method created a scheme for secret key
generation and recovery based on iris verification, rather than storing keys or
iris templates, it stores recovery information on a smart card carried by the user.
This approach uses error-correcting codes to overcome the noisiness inherent
in biometric readings in order to achieve correct key generation. Wang and Ma
(2012) used smart card-based authentication scheme for key agreement. A smart
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card-based authentication scheme with key agreement suitable for global comput-
ing environments was proposed. The main advantages of this approach are that a
security-sensitive verification table is not required in the server, the password can
be chosen and changed freely by the clients and cannot be derived by the privileged
administrator of the server. Also, the client and the server can establish a common
session key. Thismethodology can protect the client secret key even if the smart card
is damaged. On the subject of key exchange and key update, Guo, Xu, Li, Yao, and
Mu (2013) usingmulti-identity keymanagement protocol, proposed an efficient and
dynamic identity-based authenticated key management protocol to optimize key
management for a user withmultiple identities, this scheme allows a user with some
basic identities to compute a new private key when some new identities are involved.
Some important deductions made from this review are as follows:
1. The techniques that utilizes smart-card approach have similar limitations,
for example, there is a possibility of the user misplacing the smart-card or it
being stolen or damaged.
2. Attribute-based encryption is commonly used to authorize access to sections
in EHRs, and hierarchical architecture to distribute keys in the hierarchy.
3. Most of the methods that were proposed for the EHR gives full control to the
patient, allowing them to determine who to grant authorize access and this
can affect the clinician workflow if encryption is total.
4. The most common-used technique to implement EHRs is attribute-based
encryption.
Methodology
Proposed architecture of the hierarchical key encryption system (HKES) for
health record
As represented in Figure 1 in the proposed system, the encrypted EHR is orga-
nized into hierarchical structure. The patient record is further broken down
Figure . Hierarchical key encryption system for EHR.
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into a high-level categories and subcategories. A record partitioned according to
a single hierarchy does not necessarily imply that a structure cannot be easily
extended in a case where there are several different hierarchies which can be
used to organize the patient’s record. This proposed system allows a patient to
generate his or her own decryption key which will be used to generate subkeys
to authorize access to only certain parts of his or her record, and for a period of
time, thereby, establishing a common session key. A key design consideration for
this system is to allow the patient to delegate access to any subset of their records
categories to any requester such as doctor, dentist, psychiatrists, employer, or
spouse. This is because a patient may not want to share his or her entire record
with a certain requester for personal reasons to avoid unwanted discrimination
and embarrassment. First, the patient will generate and store his or her own secret
key, which will be called the root key. Second, the patient can use this root key
to generate subkeys for various categories or subcategories. To authorize rights to
access a particular record on the hierarchy, the patient would generate and attach
a private subkey to their record categories, these session-based keys would be
established and acknowledged to authorize access to the record for the stipulated
period.
Considering the sample hierarchy displayed in Figure 1, the basic health informa-
tion record or bio-data will always be unencrypted and the contents of such “pub-
lic” category were described in Omotosho and colleagues (2017). The patient might
decide to grant her dentist access to both the dental records category and the med-
ical information category. This would allow the dentist to read all data concerning
dental appointment, dental x-rays, and allergies. However, the dentist would have no
way of decrypting any of the information in the patient’s surgical records, ormedical
imaging data. Dental records is an ancestor of dental x-rays because dental x-rays
are contained in dental records.
In deriving the system architecture in Figure 2, we assumed that the patient
records are stored as a group of records or entries and each record contains the
name of the record, the name of the categories in that record, and the record tag
which is used to identify the record and the encrypted record itself. The record tag
will be encrypted along with the record so as not to reveal any information about
the record.
Building the HKES
In the proposed system, we say that cat represents the category on the hierarchy, cat
(xl, . . ., xe) specifies a category on the hierarchy where (xl) is the top level ancestor
of the category, (x1, x2) specifies the next ancestor down the hierarchy and so on.
skroot specifies the decryption root key for the patient.
HKES symmetric algorithm (adapted from Benaloh et al., )
This describes the construction for a hierarchical set of categories, which only allows
a private key encryption.
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Figure . Hierarchical key encryption system for EHR conceptual model.
i. The key generation algorithm KeyGen(1k) → skroot which takes as input the
security parameter k and generates a root decryption key for the patient skroot.
ii. They key derivation algorithm F(KeyDer(sk (x1, . . ., xe-1, t);(x1, . . ., xe)) →
sk (x1, . . ., xe) takes as input the name of a category specified as a hierarchical
list (x1, . . ., xe) and the decryption key sk(x1, . . ., xe-1) for the patient category
cat(x1, . . ., xe). or (skroot for e = 1). It outputs a decryption key sk(x1, . . ., xe)
for category cat(x1, . . ., xe).
iii. The encryption algorithm Enc(sk(x1, . . ., xe); (x1, . . ., xe); m) → c takes as
input a public key, a messagem, a category name specified as (x1, . . ., xe), and
the corresponding decryption key sk (x1, . . ., xe). It outputs an encryption of
m for category cat(x1, . . ., xe).
iv. A decryption algorithm Dec(sk (x1, . . ., xe); (x1, . . ., xe); c) m takes as
input the name of a category ((x1, . . ., xe)), a corresponding decryption key
sk (x1, . . ., xe) and a ciphertext c. It outputs decryptedmessagem if the cipher-
text was formed correctly for category cat(x1, . . ., xe).
Root key generationmethod
For the purpose of demonstrating the HKES, the Blum Blum Shub (BBS) algorithm
for Pseudo RandomNumber Generator (PRNG) is used for generating the root key.
BBS chooses two odd primes p and q, and compute n = p and q (Ankur & Divyan-
jaliy, 2013; Sidorenko& Schoenmakers, 2005) Then squaremodulo n of seed is com-
puted and the resulting number is considered to be the first number generated. The
seed is replaced with generated number in subsequent iterations and a square mod-
ulo n is computed again, generating a number per iteration. To gather bit sequence,
least significant bit of generated number is extracted per iteration and is added to the
generated binary sequence. Hence, BBS needs only one square (or multiplication)
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per bit generated. Let the seed be s, s ∈ Zn, then first number is
X1 ≡ s2 mod n and the bit b1 ≡ X1 mod 2
For ith iteration
Xi ≡ X2i−1mod n and bi ≡ Ximod 2
This way the algorithm needs to compute only one square operation to generate
a bit, which is much less than any of the other cryptographically secure algorithm.
Following is the pseudo code of the algorithm:
BLUM_BLUM_SHUB (SEED):
i. X0 = SEED
ii. Choose two odd prime p and q
iii. n ← p . q
ii. l ← length of sequence
v. for i ← 1 to l
vi. do xi ≡ x2i−1 mod n
vii. do bi ≡ xi mod 2
return B = 〈b1b2b3....bi〉
Vulnerabilities of BBS. The security of BBS is related to the hardness of factorization
which makes it a quite effective PRNG but BBS is not the most secure PRNG and
it has two problems: (a) BBS can be very slow and (b) the existence of the proof of
security for BBS can also be misleading and usually misinterpreted.
The standard proof of security states that if you choose a modulus N that is large
enough, then no attacker will be able to efficiently break BBS. For BBS to be provably
secure, it needs a very big modulus, larger than those regularly used with RSA. Such
that, if using BBS with a 2048-bit modulus, there is no proof of security and using
BBS this way renders the security warranty null and void; the proof is no longer
applicable. However, if using BBS with amuch larger modulus, the resulting effect is
that BBS becomes ridiculously slow. In other words, BBS is a very good theoretical
construct, but of negligible relevance to practical crypto-engineering (Chatterjee,
Menezes, & Sarkar, 2011; Sidorenko & Schoenmakers, 2005)
Implementation and discussions
Figure 3 shows the homepage of the patient. The design of this EHR allows patients
to have full control to their health record except some “public” basic health informa-
tion record. Patients, therefore, can determinewho can viewor access the other parts
of their record. The side tabs allow the patient to navigate and browse easily through
the system. For a patient to book an appointment with a doctor, the patient has to
request for a doctor on their page as shown in Figure 4 and selects from the list of
available doctors provided by their registered hospital. After a successful establish-
ment of a session, the patient then selects the record categories that the requesting
doctor will be allowed to view, depending on the medical conditions diagnosed for
as shown in Figure 5. The Y and N symbol means YES and NO. Selecting Y means
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Figure . Patient’s homepage.
Figure . Patient request for doctor.
Figure . Patient grants access to record.
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Figure . Key generation phase.
that a record can be viewed and that the current doctor has the decryption key to the
selected record categories.WhileNmeans the record is still encrypted and restricted
and the doctor will only be able to view records after the patient has provided their
decryption keys. This is due to the fact that almost all of the categories of a patient’s
EHR is encrypted by default andnothing confidential can be accessed until a decryp-
tion key is explicitly initiated on any of the categories except the “public” bio-data.
After the patient has granted access to specific leaves or categories of their EHR as
requested by the doctor, he or she generates the decryption key as seen in Figure 6
from the root key where other subkeys are derived. Using similar platforms, the
decryption key of the selected record will then be available to the doctor to enable
him or her access to the specified record for the current session before the key
expires. Once the key expires, it is becomes useless and the doctor will not be able
to access the record beyond this period until another key is derived.
Also, the patient has the privilege of updating their records as shown Figure 7
and can determine for themselves how their records are viewed, the person that
Figure . Update health record.
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Figure . Doctor’s page.
should be allowed to view their records, and the duration the person have to view
the records.
The doctor’s homepage provides a list of current and past patients as shown in
Figure 8. Each record has an action button where there is an option to open the
patient’s record or attend to the patient. If the doctor needs to open or view the health
record of a patient, a decryption key of that record must be available as depicted
in Figure 9 before access can be granted to view the record. If the key is not pro-
vided, the system will trigger an access denial message as seen in Figure 10. If the
decryption key is accepted by the system, the doctor can then have access to the
records categories he or she has been granted as demonstrated in Figure 11. When
the decryption key expires, the doctor no longer have access to the health record as
shown in Figure 12 and the system will trigger a key renewal message which will
pop up asking the doctor to request new keys. A successful authorization will allow
Figure . Security check.
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Figure . Security check with error message.
Figure . Patient’s health record.
Figure . Key expiration.
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Figure . Update EHR.
a doctor to update patients’ EHR with the diagnosis, prescription, and comments
about the patient medical condition in the form provided in Figure 13.
Implication and conclusion
Paper-based methods of health record management has several challenges such as:
limitations of storage difficulty, patient record beingmisplaced, among others. These
shortcomings led to the evolution of the electronic health system in which the con-
fidentiality of personal health records of the patient has serious issue. A session
based hierarchical key encryption system has been developed in this article to pro-
tect patients’ privacy and confidentiality by not exposing records or information to
every requester in a hospital and third parties. The proposed system splits patients’
records in encrypted hierarchical fashion that allows patients’ to have almost full but
not total control over their record. Patients can then generate the decryption keys for
record leaves that needed to be accessed by the doctor or authorized user for a ses-
sion. This approach could improve patient’s trust and appreciation of EHR because,
patients can determine for themselves by whom and when their EHR record cat-
egories can be accessed. When a cipher key expires, the requester will no longer
be able to access until the key is renewed by the patient. Also, physician can carry
out their routine without a breakdown in their work flow once they have the right
permissions. During emergency, patients can be identified and given basic care that
will not breach their privacy because encryption is not total. It is recommended that
future work should include more categories of health records and other forms of
access policies.
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